In the last decades, numerous studies have argued that political institutions are able to leave a persistent cultural legacy. Spain today presents a geographically concentrated distribution of societal traits that are related to social and political participation. This paper examines the pos sible historical origin of these regional patterns and concludes a) that those regions that histori cally experienced more inclusive political systems exhibit currently higher levels of this culture of participation and b) that inclusive institutions are able to leave a more intense cultural legacy when they are more proximate to the bulk of the population. This thesis is robust to controlling for other possible determinants.
Introduction
Over the last decades, the study of the cultural aspects of a society has gained increased interest within political economy. This increasing interest is due to the (re)discovery of cul ture (beliefs, values, traditions, customs, etc.) as a fundamental element in the explanation of the functioning and evolution of formal institutions (Roland, 2004; North, 2005; Caballero and Soto-Oñate, 2015) and economic performance through time (North, 1990; 48 david soto-oñate Nanetti, 1993, Knack and Keefer, 1997; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006, 2011; Fernández, 2008 Fernández, , 2011 .
Some well-known cultural traits within the research programs of political culture, social capital or institutional economics have been related to better political and eco nomic performance. These cultural traits include: personal independence, generalized trust, political involvement and social participation, among many others. Important works have pointed out the role of inclusive institutional frameworks in the development of these cultural traits (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a; Tabellini, 2010 , Becker et al., 2016 , but little research has been done with regard to which characteristics of inclusive institutions leave which kind of cul tural traits. This article deepens the link between inclusive institutions and the develop ment of cultural patterns of participation and cooperation and attempts to introduce and analyze the role of proximity in the depth of the imprint that inclusive institutions leave on culture. Proximity refers to how close and transcendental the inclusive institutions are to the life of the broad majority of the population. If those inclusive institutions are proximate, they are supposed to be able to leave a more persistent and intensive cultural imprint on a society. This paper examines the regional patterns across Spain in terms of what is called here political culture of participation and argues that they may partially find their roots in the distant past. For that purpose, it delves into Spanish history and focuses on two historical institutional experiences that presented significant differences across regions. They will allow us to proxy the comparative level of inclusiveness in their political organization and the proximity of the political process to the population. The inclusiveness of political institutions at the local level is proxied by the capacity of the towns to develop their own custom-based legal order in the High Middle Ages. At that time, the municipalities of some Iberian areas held a transcendental part of the political process for the everyday life of the population. At a different level of proximity -the top of the State-inclusiveness is proxied by the levels of constraints on the executive during the Modern Age in the differ ent kingdoms. The article provides evidence that (a) past inclusive political experiences may have played a determinant role in shaping the current disparities of participation patterns across the Spanish regions and (b) inclusive institutions were better able to leave this cultural imprint when they affected the political process at a more proximate level to the bulk of the population.
Section 2 reviews the literature on political culture, the cultural legacy of institutions and the mechanisms of long-term cultural persistence. Section 3 introduces the Spanish case, presents the current regional distribution of political culture of participation and the distinc tive political trajectories that Spanish regions followed prior to unification. In section 4, the theses are empirically tested. Finally, the last section discusses the results and draws some concluding remarks.
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ence between the formal political system and the political culture. We can thus identify a set of ideal traits that coherently fit the political system of democracy and that we could call political culture of democracy. That is, an ideal political culture that is proper to the demo cratic institutional system and makes it well-functioning and long-lasting. The present article is focused on a subset of traits within this political culture of democracy that foster active participation and cooperation. This subset of traits will be called herein the political culture of participation 1 . These traits are similar to those included in the concept of social capital, which in Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti's (1993) work also finds its roots in the political culture literature. They are of interest since they are associated with, among other issues, the practical performance of democratic institutions through political accountability, govern mental effectiveness, low levels of corruption or the overcoming of collective-action prob lems Nanetti, 1993, 1988; Boix and Posner, 1998; Uslaner, 2004; Nannicini et al., 2013) .
Inasmuch as participation is an important part of an ideal political culture of democracy, it has concentrated a great deal of attention in Spain (Morales, 2005; Montero, Font and Tor cal, 2006; Cantijoch and San Martin, 2009 ) and several works revealed internal differences in participation based on gender, age, level of education, income and occupation (Justel 1992; Morán and Benedicto, 1995; Morales, 1999; Ferrer et al., 2006; Morales, Mota and Pérez-Nievas, 2006; Morán, 2011) , and across Spanish regions (Montero and Torcal, 1990b; Mota and Subirats, 2000; Frías, 2001; Mota, 2008) . However, very little attention has been paid to the origins of these regional differences across Spain.
Those studies that attempt to explain participation based on individual features or im mediate experiences with the political system are complemented by this approach, which suggests the existence of a generalized component rooted in the cultural environment. As will be seen in section 3, the highest levels of political culture of participation are concen trated in the northeastern quarter of the Iberian Peninsula and this article attempts to explain this geographical distribution by suggesting a possible institutional origin. The next para graphs review the literature about the role of historical events, especially political experi ences, in the shaping of these cultural traits and the mechanisms through which they can persist in the long term.
Roles of historical institutions in the origins of political culture disparities
Although culture is in constant evolution, it is also evident that a persistent or slow-moving cultural component exists that reflects historical experiences and is able to condition its evolu tionary path (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Roland, 2004; Portes, 2005) . In the last decades, im portant empirical studies were conducted on some highly persistent cultural traits that found their roots in a distant past (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a; Tabellini, 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn., 2013; Giuliano and Nunn, 2013) . This cultural legacy is able to 51 49
On the Cultural Legacy of Political Institutions: Evidence from the Spanish Regions persist even after its original circumstances have long ago disappeared. Part of these works has pointed out political experiences as powerful factors that deeply shape culture.
Two dimensions of institutions are taken into account here: inclusiveness and proximity. Inclusiveness is the level to which the members of a population condition political decision making and/or their interests are reflected in the institutions and public policy. In its concrete form, inclusiveness is usually associated with more democratic institutions, rule of law, separation of powers, or a set of individual rights and liberties for civil, political and eco nomic matters. Those institutional environments where participation is permitted and even requested are better able to make participation and cooperation traditions flourish. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to think that in systems in which the political processes were more proximate (i.e., in which the bulk of the important political decisions were made at a closer level to the population), the inclusive institutional environment would be more capable of generating the dynamics of political participation and the schemes of thought about the Political that leave a persistent imprint in the local culture. This proximity of the political process makes reference not only to geographical space but also to the location of the po litical process within the strata of a State's hierarchy and its distance with regard to the bulk of the population.
Important works have highlighted the relevance of inclusive political experiences at local levels in the development of persistent cultural patterns. For instance, Giuliano and Nunn (2013) suggest in an empirical research paper that democratic experiences at local levels helped to generate persistent beliefs and attitudes toward the appropriateness of democratic institutions. The case of Italy has been deeply studied (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a ) and provides us with some guid ance on the mechanisms through which inclusive institutions at local levels may generate these traits. It was suggested that the current disparities in societal traits across Italian re gions have their roots in their different local political experiences during the Middle Ages. During the eleventh century, the Normans invaded the southern part of Italy and established "a feudal monarchy, which continued in some forms or another until the Italian unification in 1861" (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a, p. 10) . This regime, highly hierarchical and bureaucratic, precluded the formation of independent city-states. Even "any glimmerings of communal autonomy were extinguished as soon as they appeared" (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, p. 123) , thereby hindering the development of civic traits. In contrast, in northern city-states, "those who governed the communal republics acknowledged legitimate limits on their rule. Elaborate legal codes were promulgated to confine the violence of the overmighty. In this sense, the structure of authority in the communal republics was funda mentally more liberal and egalitarian … [and] provided a breadth of popular involvement in public decision making without parallel in the medieval world" (Putnam, Leonardi and Na netti, 1993, p. 125) . From this perspective, it is understood that the effects of these historical institutional configurations have persisted until the present day by way of culture. Similar phenomena were attributed to inclusiveness at the top of the State hierarchy. Tabellini (2010) considered institutional constraints on the executive as having an impact in the development of similar cultural traits by preventing the elites from undertaking arbitrary actions and providing a space for individual freedom where cooperative behaviors could flourish. Becker et al. (2016) argued that the serious and well-functioning bureaucracy of the Habsburg Empire left a cultural legacy that promoted generalized trust and discouraged cor ruption. Although not related to the dimension of inclusiveness, other works showed how preferences could be shaped by the political regime and are able to persist in the long term. For instance, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) argued that 45 years of state intervention and communist indoctrination in east Germany instilled in people the notion that the state is essential for individual well-being; and Peisakhin (2015) presented how contemporary Ukraine is regionally divided in terms of political attitudes and behavior by the ancient bor der that separated the Austrian and the Russian empires.
The current article contributes to this literature by providing evidence and reflecting on the capacity of institutions to leave a cultural imprint depending on their degree of proximity.
Reverse causality and other background determinants
The causal relation between formal institutions and deep elements of culture (beliefs, values, attitudes, etc.) acts in both directions, and both directions have been covered in the social sciences 2 . Important institutionalists in history, economics, political science and soci ology have focused on how cultural elements are of fundamental importance for institu tional performance and evolution (Denzau and North, 1995; Roland, 2004; Portes, 2005; North, 2005; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2013) . In turn, other works were centered on how political experiences leave a long-lasting cultural legacy (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a; Tabellini, 2010; Peisakhin, 2015; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2014; Becker et al., 2016) . It would thus be short-sighted to neglect this bidi rectionality. The problem of reverse causality between culture and institutions hinders causal inference. One common way to overcome reverse-causality problems in economics has been to resort to the so-called natural or historical experiments (Dunning, 2008; Dia mond and Robinson, 2010) . They require finding historical events in which the effect of in stitutions on culture (the causal direction of interest) is observable in isolation from the effect of culture on institutions. Section 3 presents the conditions that allow one to consider the case of Spain within the framework of a natural experiment.
Besides endogeneity problems, other important relevant factors like socioeconomic modernization have preoccupied researchers when approaching this matter. In a famous ar ticle, Lipset (1959) suggested that the "modernization" associated to economic development led to or permitted the development of a sustainable and long-lasting democracy by generat ing fundamental sociocultural transformations. Inglehart and Baker (2000) empirically sup ported his thesis and concluded that economic development tends to push societies in a common direction but, rather than converging, they move in parallel, path-dependent trajec tories that are shaped by their cultural heritages. In another empirical study, Inglehart and 
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On the Cultural Legacy of Political Institutions: Evidence from the Spanish Regions Welzel (2010) explore the mechanism that links economic development to democratization and argue that prosperity certainly tends "to bring enduring changes in a society's values and, at high levels of development, make the emergence and survival of democratic institutions incrementally likely." Persson and Tabellini (2009) propose a feedback link between devel opment and democratization through what they called democratic capital, an accumulated stock of civic and social assets. Therefore, shifts in cultural traits could have also been brought about by socioeconomic transformations and this must be taken into account.
The mechanisms for long-term persistence
An institutional environment can generate shared attitudes and behavioral patterns in a community as an immediate, rational response to the institutional environment's conditions. For instance, Almond and Verba (1963) argue that apathy toward public issues may be a realistic response to a political environment due to the complexity of the political matters or the difficulties of getting information. However, in this kind of works we address the persis tent imprint left by an institutional environment that no longer exists. This is what is known as the long shadow of history or, more specifically, the cultural legacy of political institu tions. But, how can this long cultural shadow of history persist across centuries? Generally, researchers on this topic have appealed to an essentially cultural mechanism. In the last two decades, in order to explain cultural persistence, economists and political scientists have devoted a great deal of effort to the theoretical modelling and empirical investigation of the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, 2011; Giuliano, 2007; Tabellini, 2008; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008b; Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011) . For instance, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008b) propose a theoretical model to explain how as a result of an historical im pact a community can be trapped in a low-trust equilibrium; however, a positive shock to the benefit of cooperation can permanently shift the equilibrium toward a cooperative one. They build an overlapping-generations model in which children learn beliefs and values from their parents and then, after interacting within the society, they inculcate (update) values in the next generation. This is the logic that complements the reasoning of this article. Therefore, it is assumed that, at aggregate levels, combined schemes of socialization and historical ex perience are what generate the patterns of persistence and change in a political culture.
The case of Spain
The intricate interrelationships among variables, the local specificities or the difficulty of measuring the qualitative complexity of culture and institutions distort the conclusions of the comparative research across nations. In recent decades, the usefulness of country (analytic) nar ratives to study complex puzzles such as those involving formal institutions, culture and eco nomic performance have been highlighted (Rodrik, 2003) . They permit one to hold variables of 54 david soto-oñate interest or background variables constant, circumvent reverse causality and be more accurate with descriptions and interpretations. This is also the aim of natural experiments, which often find the proper conditions in specific events of a nation's history. According to Diamond and Robinson (2010, p. 2) , natural experiments consist of "comparing … different systems that are similar in many respects but that differ with respect to the factors whose influence one wishes to study". They are empirical approaches that aim to take advantage of the inferential power of true experi ments. In true experiments, researchers compare the response of experimental subjects to treat ment with the response of a control group, the assignment of the subjects to treatment is random, and the manipulation of the treatment is under the control of the experimental researcher (Dun ning, 2008) . However, in social happenings, generally, the manipulation of the treatment and the background factors are out of experimenter's control. In natural experiments, researchers find the conditions in which the assignment of the subjects to treatment and control conditions is "as if" random. This is why, as Dunning (2008) argues, a detailed case-based knowledge is fundamental "both to recognizing the existence of a natural experiment and to gathering the kinds of evidence that make the assertion of 'as if' random assignment compelling". The case of Spain presents the conditions for a natural experiment to study (a) the causal link between the inclusiveness of political institutions and the development of cul tural traits that foster participation and (b) the autonomous persistence of this cultural legacy until the present time. Figure 1 uses a simplified outline to illustrate the chain of events and the causal flows covered in this reasoning.
Chronologically, figure 1 suggests that there was an exogenous impact, the so-called Reconquista -the Christian Reconquest-that established an early distribution of political institutions across Spain that had nothing or little to do with previous political cultures in the regions. It represents an "as if" random assignment of the subjects to treatment. This impact
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On the Cultural Legacy of Political Institutions: Evidence from the Spanish Regions laid the foundations of regional institutional trajectories, which were coevolving in continu ous feedback with regional political cultures, until political unification. The dashed line in dicates the moment from which political institutions no longer show regional variation, leaving the regional political cultures theoretically isolated from a regionally distinctive ef fect of formal political institutions. Of course, political institutions were still affecting po litical culture, but the effect of regionally distinctive political institutions no longer exists (remember that our intention is to know the cause of the regional distribution of cultural patterns). At this moment is when the shadow of history operates. It is understood that the old distribution of cultural traits affects the current one through a long and complex mecha nism of intergenerational transmission in the fashion of those presented in section 2.
The exogenous impact of the medieval Reconquista allows us to observe a causal direc tion in the origin from institutions to political culture. On the other hand, modern Spanish unification offers the chance to investigate to what extent the current geographic distribution of political culture of participation is due to a long-lasting legacy that is capable to autono mously persist even when the originating institutional circumstances have long disappeared. Additionally, the Spanish case, as a novelty, permits one to reflect on the possible role of proximity in the generation of these traits.
The following subsections deepen this outline addressing three key questions: (a) How the regional patterns of political culture of participation are and how they are measured (subsection 3.1); (b) how the inclusiveness of the regional political trajectories are measured (subsection 3.2); and (c) why early political institutions in the regions are exogenous to a previous political culture (subsection 3.3).
The regional distribution of political culture of participation in Spain
In this subsection, a summary index of political culture of participation is constructed from survey data. This index is meant to proxy how political culture of participation is ex tended across the Spanish provinces. These traits are directly associated to political involve ment and active participation, so the indicators should attempt to proxy beliefs, values and attitudes related to both the active role of the individual as a political actor and the intensity of his or her links with the political realm.
Initially, six cultural indicators are built from different surveys. Later, a summary vari able, called Participation Index, is constructed from the first principal component of those indicators to reflect the variation of these cultural traits across 50 Spanish provinces (the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla are excluded).
Unfortunately, the available data are scarce and this fact involves a number of complica tions. There is no complete survey that could provide us with all the needed indicators, so we have to resort to different surveys from the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológi cas (CIS), which nonetheless will not make it possible to cover all the factors that would be 56 david soto-oñate desirable (e.g., early socialization process at home, generalized trust, social values, etc.). The aim of this index is to obtain a proxy for the provincial variation of this political culture of participation, but, lamentably, the sample of some of the considered surveys is designed to obtain regional aggregations at the autonomous community level and not at the provincial level 3 . Only the CIS surveys of 2000, 2008a, 2011a and 2015 are designed to get provincial aggregations. The other surveys from CIS (1998, 2002, 2008b and 2011b) , although they cover all the Spanish provinces, provide an insufficient amount of observations for the small est ones. Therefore, from the six indicators (which will be presented below), three will be aggregated at the autonomous community level 4 and three at the provincial level. This con struction, mixing aggregates at provincial and autonomous community levels, makes sense under the assumption that there exists certain consubstantiality among these variables and therefore their real provincial variability within the autonomous communities is similar.
To build this proxy for political culture of participation, we take into account informa tion about people's interest in politics (intpol) 5 , the frequency in which they are involved in conversations on politics (convpol) 6 , their information-seeking habits about politics (info pol) 7 , their feeling of being informed about politicians' activities (infogov) 8 , and their ten dency to participate in voluntary civil organizations (association) 9 and in unconventional political actions (action) 10,11 .
A summary variable called Participation Index is obtained from the first principal compo nent of all these six measures -intpol, infopol, convpol, infogov, association and action. The principal component analysis returns a normalized variable, so this index shows mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Its highest value is reached in Madrid (2.84) and the lowest in Badajoz (-1.78). Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of the resulting variable. The highest val ues are located in northern Spain, especially in the northeastern quarter of the Iberian Peninsula. 
The regional political trajectories
As suggested above, the Spanish regions followed distinctive political paths. These re gionally distinctive political paths end with the unification process. This fact is of fundamen tal importance, since it integrates all the regions in the same formal political institutional framework. Thus we do not consider formal institutions as transmitters of regional variation after unification. This is how we theoretically isolate subsequent political culture from the effect of subsequent formal political institutions.
This subsection presents the distinctive political paths that regions followed before uni fication in the early 18 th century. We focus on two different periods in Spanish history that permit us to establish an interregional comparison in terms of political institutions. In each period, we can find institutional elements that present significant differences across regions and reveal information on the level of inclusiveness of the political institutional system and the level of proximity of the political process. These institutional elements illustrate the level of inclusiveness of the institutional sys tems in the regions at two different levels of the State hierarchy. The inclusiveness of politi cal institutions at the local level is proxied by the capacity of the towns to develop their own custom-based legal order in the High Middle Ages. At a different level of proximity, the top of the State, inclusiveness is proxied by the levels of constraints on the executive during the Modern Age in the different kingdoms. The following paragraphs assess both political expe riences.
Local-level inclusiveness: Municipal autonomy in High Middle Ages
The literature review mentioned the case of Italy and highlighted the importance of the experiences of the northern free cities in the Middle Ages for the development of these cul tural traits. We do not find in Spain free city-state cases in the Italian sense, but there did exist other kinds of political experiences at the municipal level during the High Middle Ages that presented clear regional disparities in terms of inclusiveness.
During the process of the Reconquista (8 th -15 th centuries), the Iberian Peninsula experi enced a peculiar period in terms of sociopolitical organization. Significant events of this time, like the existence of a weak central and integrative power or the need to repopulate the newly conquered areas, gave rise to a wide range of political and legal arrangements at the local level across Medieval Spain. At this time, the municipalities were endowed with great competences, to the extent that in some areas the bulk of the important political decisions were located in the municipal corporations.
In the early stages of the Reconquista, the towns that were founded or repopulated were provided with a kind of contract, similar to small constitutions, called fueros, cartas forales or cartas pueblas, in which a series of rights and freedoms were granted to the inhabitants. They were intended to make more attractive the newly reconquered areas and consolidate positions against Muslim raids.
The first documents granted were very much reduced and are known as fueros breves (brief fueros). They were fundamentally used in the central and northern areas of the Iberian Peninsula. This legislative corpus was insufficient to cover all the normative necessities that the daily life required. Therefore, gaps in the legal code had to be covered by another com plementary legal code or (formally or informally) completed by locally developed legal codes or customary norms.
Later, in more advanced stages of the Reconquista, fueros extensos (extensive fueros) became more common. The elites of the kingdoms tended to offer more complete legal or ders and, from a certain point on, large codes were imposed with territorial scope either as complementary texts or definitively displacing the local codes.
Until the eventual imposition of these large codes of territorial scope, extensive areas of the Iberian geography in its northern half were in need of a way to autonomously complete their own local law -endowed only with a brief fuero-either by the relatively direct and ac tive participation of an important proportion of the population, the use of political delegates or through the judicial creation of law. However, this was only so in the northeastern part of the Iberian Peninsula, since the elites of the western kingdoms opted to complement the local orders with the Visigothic law 12 as an underlying legal corpus.
According to García-Gallo, "in stark contrast to the Visigothic system, centered on the validity of Liber Iudiciorum, we find what we could characterize as free law; that is, an al ways-in-progress legal order, within which the norms to be applied are freely sought for each case, and for any dispute judges judge freely according to their 'free will' " (García-Gallo, 1979, p. 377). They created or formalized the law in accordance to what is "in the mind of the population", even when it was not previously formalized. Except in rare cases, "it never was a capricious and arbitrary decision by the judge, since the people would have never ac cepted such a regime" (García-Gallo, 1979, p. 369) . With regard to the expansion of this judicial creation of law, "it had deep roots in Castile 13 , Navarra and Aragon" (Gacto et al., 2009, pp. 121-122) . Although not by the judicial process, in these regions and in the Basque Provinces (Gacto et al., 2009, p. 204) and Catalonia (García-Gallo, 1979, p. 445) custom based legislation was also developed by local political actors.
It is a tough challenge to spatially delimit the extension of this kind of organization, comparatively more inclusive and autonomous, across medieval Spain; especially because a gradual degeneration of these features occurred both over time and in the spatial margins. Relying on the catalog of fueros by Barrero and Alonso (1989) , figure 3 .A illustrates the distribution of towns with known brief fueros and no complementary legal code before the beginning of the royal enactment of extensive fueros and long codes of territorial regency, such as the Ordenamiento de Alcalá in Castile (1348) 14 . We thus take into account here the regency of a custom-based legislation locally developed as a proxy for the geo graphic extension of this modality of municipal organization that is comparatively more autonomous and inclusive. Although autonomy certainly was a sine qua non condition to maintain inclusive institutions in the period from the 9 th to the 13 th century, it does not mean that municipal autonomy leads necessarily to political inclusiveness. The empirical founda tion addressing the comparative inclusiveness in these areas is provided by historians. With this information we build a dummy variable -Local-level inclusiveness in Middle Ages-that takes value 1 in 20 current provinces in the northeastern quarter of the Iberian Peninsula -Alava, Avila, Barcelona, Biscay, Burgos, Cantabria, Girona, Guadalajara, Gipuz koa, Huesca, La Rioja, Lleida, Madrid, Navarre, Segovia, Soria, Tarragona, Teruel, Valladolid and Zaragoza-as presented in figure 3 .B. This variable, by capturing the autonomy in the elaboration of local law in the towns of the province, attempts to proxy the geographic exten sion of these more inclusive and autonomous municipal organizations. The reasoning behind it is that in these places that were granted with a fuero breve, and did not have an underlying extensive legal code to complement it, the population had to complete their own legislative framework by an explicit protodemocratic political process and/or the judicial creation of law. In this environment, comparatively more inclusive, the population as a whole was more influential upon the political process than in the rest of the territories.
State-level inclusiveness: Constraints on the executive in the Early Modern Age
The disparities among the political systems that coexisted within early modern Spain are broadly known. Even though the same monarch held both crowns -Castile and Aragon-they were separate regimes, with different political institutions, bodies, traditions, etc. However, drawing a solid comparative assessment about the inclusiveness of these different systems is a difficult task. Diverse ways of accounting for the different elements of political organiza tion have emerged within political economy, and the level of constitutional and parliamen tary constraints on the executive was considered a key aspect. Thereby, they attempted to compare the extent to which the executive power was monitored and constrained by an or ganized body, such as a parliament or equivalent.
In this paper, the assessment of the institutional environment in early modern Spanish regions relies on Tabellini's (2010) work. Tabellini evaluated past political institutions in the regions of five countries -including Spain-with regard to their constraints on the executive in the years 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850. Following Polity IV methodology (see Tabellini's 2005 work ing paper), he assigns values from 1 to 7 in his evaluation of constraints on the executive, with 1 being "unlimited authority" and 7 being "accountable executive, constrained by checks and bal ances". Between both extremes other situations are defined. A value of 3 is assigned if an execu tive has to face real but limited constraints (e.g., a legislative body with more than consultative functions). A value of 5 is assigned when executive power is subject to substantial constraints (e.g., a legislature that often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action or refuses funds to the executive). There are even values that correspond to transitions between situations. The values proposed by Tabellini for the Spanish regions (autonomous communities) are presented in the first columns of the table B.1 in Appendix B. He assigns a higher value to current autonomous communities of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencian Community in the years 1600 and 1700 due to the presence of stronger legislative Courts (the Cortes), as opposed to those in the Crown of Castile and the equivalent body in the Kingdom of Mallorca.
However, this part of Spanish history remains controversial (Grafe, 2012) . The traditional liberal perspective that sees the early modern Castilian Crown as absolutist, unconstrained and highly centralized has been strongly contested (e.g., Jago 1981; Thompson 1982; Fernández-Albadalejo 1984; Fortea 1991) . Revisionist historians have argued that although the Castilian Cortes were actually debilitated over time, the power of the monarch was still constrained by the power of the elites of the main cities. Eventually, fiscal matters were bargained directly be tween individual cities' elites and the monarch with no need to summon the Cortes. Yet still something can be said about the differences. Although the Crown of Castile should not be con sidered as a strongly centralized state, during the early modern age "the centralization and the tendency to absolutism are much greater than in the Crown of Aragon" (Le Flem et al. 1989, p. 185) . The Castilian Crown certainly faced important constraints in fiscal policy; however, in eastern kingdoms, the Cortes had a much broader role. For instance, as Gil (1993) put it, "the Cortes of Aragon preserved their status as the highest legislative organ. The Cortes of Castile, in contrast, had early lost this power to the king and his Royal Council. Exclusive royal law making was practically non-existent in Aragon, and if the viceroy had powers to issue pragmat ics, these had to be subordinated to the higher principles established in the fueros 15 .
[…] the Cortes not only dealt with fiscal matters […] , but also with legislative issues and, by extension, political questions in general". Therefore, Tabellini's comparative assessment of these systems remains useful for our purposes, but needs to be slightly revised. Following Tabellini's methodology and starting from the valuation of his indicator, the values for the levels of constraint have been modified in a new variable in order to take into account the most extended view among current Hispanists. On the one hand, the Crown of Castile could not be considered as centralized, unconstrained and absolutist; but, on the other hand, the new, modified variable has to express the difference in terms of constraints between the Crown of Castile and the Crown of Aragon before the Decrees of Nueva Planta. Therefore, the resulting valuation is the one presented in the two last columns of the table of Appendix B. The valuation for the Crown of Castile is elevated from 1 to 2 in 1600, and that of the Crown of Aragon is maintained in 3 in 1700 to express that distance contained in Gil (1993) .
From this data, we rebuild his variable pc_institutions, which is the first principal com ponent of all the periods assessed. 
On the exogeneity of early political institutions
As suggested above, the "as if" random condition in the assignment of subjects to treat ment is provided by the circumstances of the Reconquista and how they change at the differ ent stages of the process. This fact allows us to circumvent reverse causality, since that ex ogenous impact imposes an institutional distribution that has nothing or little to do with previous political cultures. In this way, we can suggest a net institutional origin and defend the exogeneity of institutions with regards to a previous political culture in the area.
The Muslim invasion and the Christian Reconquista marked a break with previous po litical organization in the Iberian Peninsula. The subsequent local political configuration resulted as a consequence of the different needs of warfare and repopulation, the different identity of the individuals or organizations in charge of them-clergymen, military organiza tions, free peasants, etc.-and the different power imbalances.
In the first stages of the Reconquista, repopulation in the northeastern quarter of the Iberian Peninsula was more spontaneous. The need to make the newly conquered territories -uninhabited and desolated by war-appealing to new settlers led the monarchs to offer bet ter institutional arrangements for those areas. The arrangements materialized into a broad set of civil and political rights and freedoms and the granting of land ownership to the settler who first ploughed it. In the last stages of the reconquest process towards the south, the in creasingly powerful religious-military orders, nobility and royal power were mainly the or ganizations in charge of not only the warfare but also the repopulation, the selection of legal orders and the distribution of land in the new areas, giving rise to a highly concentrated distribution of land and more politically hierarchical societies. This means that, as war was progressing toward the south, political organizations became more and more hierarchical and the distribution of economic resources and political power became more and more concen trated, with this being reflected in the local legal codes. We can thus recognize an important component of exogeneity in the political institutions that where established across regions in the Middle Ages.
Empirical analysis

Historical political institutions and political culture
This paper attempts to demonstrate in the first place that there exist empirical reasons to believe that the current regional differences in these political culture traits may have, at least partly, a historical and essentially political origin. More formally, the theses to be addressed are (a) that past inclusive political experiences led to the different patterns of participation in the current Spanish regions and (b) inclusive institutions are better able to leave this cultural imprint when they affect the political process at a more proximate level to the bulk of the population. This section deals with the relation between the measures of participation and
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On the Cultural Legacy of Political Institutions: Evidence from the Spanish Regions the historical institutions separately and then argues about the capacity that inclusive institu tions have to generate these cultural traits depending on their proximity. Table 1 provides the correlation coefficients between the participation measures and the historical political variables presented in section 3.2. Both historical institu tional factors present a positive relationship with the summary measure of political culture of participation and its components. Columns (1) and (2) in table 2 report ordi nary least-squares (OLS) regressions of the summary measure for political culture of participation -Participation Index -on the historical political variables-Local inclu siveness in Middle Ages and State inclusiveness in the Modern Age. Both historical variables' coefficients present a positive and significant effect on the development of these cultural traits. The following exercises introduce sets of controls in the regres sions to assess the robustness of the results.
The regressions in columns (3) and (4) in table 2 include geographical factors as con trols, which were also suggested to have a role in shaping individual preferences and cul tural traits (Landes, 1998) . The geographical control variables included in the regressions are Latitude, Longitude, Altitude, Coast Density (length of the coast divided by the province's area) and the Ruggedness of the terrain. Appendix C presents, respectively, the descriptions and the main descriptive statistics of all the used variables. After the inclusion of these geo graphical factors, the coefficient for Local-level inclusiveness remains highly significant but State-level inclusiveness loses all its predictive power. Another concern is that this distribution of cultural traits may simply be reflecting, as modernization theory could assert 16 , current regional socioeconomic conditions. These traits are supposed to be positively affected by the level of income (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) and the level of education (Campbell, 2006; Helliwell and Putnam, 2007) , whereas inequality in its various forms is supposed to have a negative impact (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Kyriacou and López-Velásquez, 2014) . However, one must also expect these issues to be endogenous to the considered cultural traits. Due to reverse causality, one must be careful when interpreting the outcomes. What we are able to assess is whether the historical political institutions had a distinctive effect on current cultural traits beyond that contained in the effect of these contemporary variables. Columns (1) and (2) of table 3 introduce a control variable for current provincial income levels: the logarithm of the average annual GDP per capita of the province between 1998 and 2008. While current levels of income are highly significant, historical political variables' coef ficients are strongly affected, losing all their significance; but, in this case, this does not mean that institutions did not play any role. It means that they do not contribute a further effect, apart from that offered by current GDP per capita; in fact, historical political in stitutions could be behind both political culture and income. Furthermore, as it was sug gested (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a, 2011; Tabellini, 2010) , culture may be the missing link between historical experiences and current economic performance; this would explain the high correlation between the three factors in favor of our thesis. This complex interrelationship exceeds the scope of this article, but should be revisited in subsequent research for the case of Spain. Columns (3) and (4) introduce the current Level of education, the average proportion of active population with postcompulsory education during the period 1998-2008, and both institutional variables remain significant and show the expected sign. Finally, the regressions in columns (5) and (6) The second thesis made reference to the level of proximity of the political process and asserted that those inclusive institutions that are more proximate to the bulk of the population are better able to leave this cultural imprint. When both historical institutional variables are included in the same regression and we make them to compete, as in table 4, Local-level inclusiveness remains always significant, except in column (3), while State-level inclusive ness loses its significance for all the specifications. This means that our proxy for inclusive ness at the top of the State has no distinctive effect when municipal experiences are taking
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On the Cultural Legacy of Political Institutions: Evidence from the Spanish Regions into account. Even despite being further back in time, the municipal experiences of inclu siveness in the Middle Ages seem to have been able to leave this cultural legacy in a more intense and persistent way or, perhaps, they were the only one capable of doing it.
About the unification assumption: The persistence of the historical private law
An issue that could raise doubts about the results is the continuity after unification of part of the historical formal institutions that were regionally distinctive and may have func tioned as an alternative origin and factor of persistence. Formal differences in private law actually transcended unification and were not been taken into account in the stylized outline of the case. In order to isolate the direct effect of local inclusiveness on these cultural traits from the possible effect of these distinctive legal orders, strategically reduced samples will be used. These subsamples represent critical zones in which one can observe variability in Local-level inclusiveness within a specific civil code. The robustness of previous results is assessed in two subsamples: (B) Those provinces of subsample A plus Catalan provinces and the Balearic Islands are included here. Despite the unification of both crowns under the political in stitutions of Castile, both Mallorca and Catalonia maintained their civil codes. If one considers that the Catalan and Balearic legal orders share common roots, one could identify them as belonging to a common legal family within which to ob serve variation in the variable Local inclusiveness (see figure 5 .B). Column (2) conducts the same regression on this new subsample and control for the fixed effects of these legal codes by including the dummy Castilian private law, which takes value 1 in the subset A. Results are again satisfactory: the coefficient for Local inclusiveness is significant and shows similar result to the basic model. 
Discussion and concluding remarks
Tons of ink have been devoted to the characteristics that citizenry should have to make democracy work. Previous research has remarked upon the importance of an active citizenry that is more interested in political matters, more informed and conscious, more willing to hold the political elites accountable, etc. This research has focused on political culture of 69 On the Cultural Legacy of Political Institutions: Evidence from the Spanish Regions participation, and a set of indicators has been used to account for its interregional variability within Spain. It addressed the origins of these differences and suggested the inclusiveness and the proximity of historical political institutions as principal factors. For that purpose, it delved into Spanish history and exposed the different political paths that regions followed. As proxies to account for the comparative level of inclusiveness in the political organization and the proximity of the political process, two factors were considered: the capacity of the municipalities to develop a custom-based legal order in the Middle Ages and the constraints on the executive at the top of the State in the Modern Age.
Both historical political experiences are positively correlated to the distribution of these cultural traits. The OLS regressions showed a significant effect of both facts, but not both of them presented the same robustness to the inclusion of other important determinants of cul ture, such as economic prosperity, education, inequality or geographic factors. The proxy for State-level inclusiveness -constraints on the executive-proved not to be robust to the inclu sion of some of these controls. Moreover, when institutional variables were made to compete in the same regression, the proxy for State-level inclusiveness lost all its significance to the measure of local-level inclusiveness. It does not mean it did not have any causal effect; it could have played a role in preserving previous comparative levels of political culture of participation. It does suggest that constraints on the executive had no distinctive effect on the development of these traits apart from that related to municipal-level inclusiveness. The re sult is consistent with previous insights (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sa pieza and Zingales, 2008a ) that suggested that prolonged experiences of more horizontal organization and citizens' empowerment at the local level were the factors that left this persistent legacy in northern Italy. In turn, an inclusive environment for the elites at the top of the political hierarchy may be insufficient to bring about cooperation and participation dynamics in the lower strata of society. The suggestive thesis of this work helps to open an elemental but necessary debate about whether inclusive institutions are linked to the develop ment of participative traits simply because they offer a space of liberty within which they autonomously flourish or, rather, it is actually necessary an invitation or demand for partici pation from the political system.
In any case, the available data to carry out this work have important limitations affecting the investigation both in the architecture of the variables and the modelling. The procedure followed in the construction of the Participation Index to obtain a more complete variable with provincial variation required mixing indicators aggregated at provincial and autono mous community levels, which may have led to an overrepresentation of autonomous com munity-level variation. The variables to proxy institutional inclusiveness are essentially dummies, which do not capture differences in degree. Additionally, the ways to proxy inclu siveness at the two levels of proximity are not homogeneous. In order to obtain convincing empirical conclusions on the role of proximity, it will be necessary to find homogeneous ways to proxy inclusiveness at different levels of proximity.
Additionally, although this and other works (Tabellini, 2010; Peisakhin, 2015; Becker et al., 2016) use the political integration of the regions to isolate culture from the subsequent national institutions in their natural experiment designs, this involves a likely simplistic as sumption that may not hold, which is that the same institutions have the same effect on dif ferent cultures. However, the coherence is different and institutions may thus have a different effect on the regional political cultures when they come into contact. When integration hap pens, institutions may affect differently the political culture of the regions. If this is true, it is not possible to speak with confidence about isolation from institutions and, therefore, of a cultural legacy that autonomously persists.
Given the limitations of this research, interpretations must be made cautiously. However, it remains useful as a starting point for further research and to motivate the elaboration of more complete surveys on political culture, covering a wider range of dimensions, allowing aggregations at lower administrative levels and thus facilitating the performance of more sophisticated models such as those used these last years (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a; Dell, 2010; Becker et al. 2016) .
There is still a long way to walk before we fully understand the historical shaping of politically relevant orientations and behaviors. Further research should disentangle the causal links between specific institutions and specific traits and the mechanisms through which they affect each other. The most immediate developments could descriptively explore the factors (historical, social, economic, educational, etc.) that explain political culture traits. Multi-level models could be of usefulness for this enterprise 18 . Finally, though substantial effort has been devoted to it, many unknowns still remain about how these political orienta tions affect political actions and how they specifically interact with the performance of a democratic institutional system. Almond and Verba (1963) . They include other dimensions related to evaluations and judg ments about the system and their main actors, involving issues such as the legitimacy of the system, support for democracy or satisfaction with the performance of political parties.
2. For an exhaustive review on this topic, see Alesina and Giuliano (2015) .
3. Autonomous communities are administrative and political entities of a higher hierarchical level. Most autono mous communities comprise more than one province (see Appendix A).
4. The value obtained for the autonomous community is imputed to its province(s).
5. From CIS (2000, 2008a, 2011a and 2015) . The four surveys ask the same question: "Generally speaking, would you say that you are interested in politics a lot, considerably, a little or nothing at all?" By pooling both waves, a substantial number of observations is obtained, with the smallest provincial sample (Soria) comprised of 916 individuals. To build this indicator, the options are valued in a range from 1 to 4, with 1 being "nothing at all" and 4 "a lot". The indicator intpol corresponds to the provincial average of this measure. By pooling these waves, the province with the smallest sample was Soria, which had 916 observations after removing the missing values.
6. From CIS (2000, 2011a and 2015) . The three surveys ask the following question: "Generally speaking, how often do you talk about politics with your friends, relatives or work colleagues?" The options are "usually," "occasionally," "rarely" and "never or almost never". To build this indicator, the options are valued in a range from 1 to 4, with 1 being "never or almost never" and 4 "usually". The indicator convpol is the provincial average of this measure. By pooling these data, the province with the smallest sample was Ávila, with 707 observations. 7. From CIS (2000) we use the questions "Could you tell me how often you read general-information newspa pers? How often do you watch the news on TV? How often do you follow the news on the radio?" For every means of communication the options are "every day or almost every day", "four or five days per week", "two or three days per week", "only in the weekends", "rarely" and "never or almost never". To build this indicator, the options are valued in a range from 1 to 6, with 1 being "never or almost never" and 6 being "every day or almost every day". A single variable is obtained from the first principal component of the three means of com munication and the indicator infopol reflects the provincial average of the variable. The smallest sample for a province corresponded to Soria, which had 233 observations. 8. From CIS (1998 and 2002) . Both surveys ask "Generally speaking, would you consider you are very informed, quite informed, a little informed or not informed at all about the activities developed by your autonomous community's government? What about the activities of your autonomous community's parliament? What about your city council's activities?" Again we value the options in a range from 1 to 4, with 1 being "not informed at all" and 4 "very informed". We extract the first principal component of the responses in the three political actors (community's government, community's parliament and city council) and construct the indica tor infogov from its average in the autonomous community. After pooling both surveys, the smallest number of observations for an autonomous community was 821 (La Rioja).
9. We obtain this information from CIS' (1998) question: "From the following associations and organizations, can you tell me about each of these organizations, whether you belong, whether you have ever belonged or whether you never belonged to...?" The kinds of associations listed were: "sports associations and groups," "local or regional societies", "religious associations", "educative, artistic and cultural associations and groups", "juvenile organizations or groups", "charitable associations", "ecologist associations", "labour unions", "political parties", "human rights organizations", "pacifist movement association", "feminist associa tions". For each kind of organization, a dummy is created, taking value 1 when the respondent currently be longs to any organization of that type. The first principal component of all the dummies is computed and the indicator association reflects its average for the autonomous communities. The autonomous community with the smallest sample was La Rioja, with 412 observations. 10. From CIS (2008b and 2011b) . Both surveys ask the same question: "I would like you to tell me whether you have carried out on many occasions, sometime or never the following actions that people may pursue in order to make known their opinion about an issue". However, because surveys do not present the same options, we take into account only those actions that appear in both surveys: "participating in a demonstration", "buying or refusing to buy a product for ethical reasons or to protect the environment", "participating in a strike" and "occupying buildings, participating in a lock-down or blocking the traffic". A single variable is created by obtaining the principal component of these four alternative political actions and the indicator action computes its average for the autonomous communities. By pooling both surveys, the smallest sample for an autonomous community was La Rioja, which had 118 observations. 11. Although political orientations and political participation itself are often treated separately to study the effect of beliefs, attitudes and values on concrete forms of participation, since this is not the intention of this research, here they are jointly used to obtain a single indicator.
12. The ancient Visigothic code Liber Iudiciorum regulated the "private relations of all kinds, procedural and criminal" (García-Gallo, 1979, p. 259) . It was an extensive and ambitious legal order that, given its romanist roots, granted the power to legislate to the monarch (Gacto et al., 2009, p. 188; Orduña, 2003, p. 108) . Al though the Liber Iudiciorum corresponds to the Visigothic period, previous to the Muslim invasion, these monarchs opted for its validity after the Reconquista. The validity of this code implied generally the impos sibility of developing an entire legal tradition based on the customs of the population and evolving according to the new requirements.
13. In that context, by mentioning Castile, the author refers to current provinces Ávila, Burgos, Guadalajara, La Rioja, Madrid, Santander, Segovia, Soria and parts of Palencia and Valladolid.
14. Although the current Valencian Community, especially in the north, received brief fueros, almost immediately after the reconquest of the zone (1261), King Jaume I promulgated a code of territorial scope for the entire Kingdom of Valencia called Furs de Valencia.
15.
Here it refers to Fueros Generales de Aragón. They ruled in a territorial scope in the whole Kingdom of Ara gon. Do not confuse with the municipal fueros.
16. For a brief discussion about this issues and modernization theory, see Section 2.
17. Unfortunately, last data that IVIE provides corresponds to 2005.
18. This empirical research was macro-analytically addressed since our independent variables of interest operate at territorial -not at individual-level.
Resumen
En las últimas décadas, numerosos trabajos se han encargado de demostrar que las instituciones políticas son capaces de dejar un legado cultural altamente persistente. En la actualidad, España presenta una distribución geográfica considerablemente concentrada de rasgos culturales que están relacionados con la participación social y política. Este artículo estudia el posible origen histórico de estos patrones re gionales y concluye a) que las regiones que experimentaron en su historia un sistema de instituciones políticas más inclusivas exhiben hoy mayores niveles de esta cultura de participación y b) que las insti tuciones inclusivas consiguen dejar un legado cultural más intenso cuando son más próximas al grueso de la población. Esta tesis es robusta incluso cuando se controla por otros posibles determinantes.
Palabras clave: cultura política, capital social, economía institucional, economía política, desempeño institucional.
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